The Internal World of Individual Choice
- Title
- The Internal World of Individual Choice
- Description
-
At a general level, the only assumptions that I wish to make about individual choice of strategy is that choice id based on benefits and costs as mediated by norms and a discount rate. As illustrated in the Figure, the general conception of the individual used here is of an individual selecting strategies as a function of weighing expected benefits and expected costs as these are in affected both by feedback from past choices, by internal norms and discount rate, and by the impact of the external world on expected benefits and costs, internal norms, and discount rate.
This general model of individual choice is thus open too many particular specifications. The particular assumptions made about the completeness, shape, differentiability, and so on, of preference functions should depend upon the situation of relevance for a particular model in this theory. - Designer
- Ostrom, Elinor
- Date
- 1987
- Bibliographic Citation
- Ostrom, Elinor. 1990 (2003 Printing). Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action. Cambridge University Press. Figure 2.1 Pages 37-38.
- Ostrom, Elinor. 1989. "Microconstitutional Change in Multiconstitutional Political Systems." Rationality & Society. Volume 1, No. 11. Figure 1. Pages 18-19.
- is depiction of attribute
- Rectangle
- use feature
- Brace
- Coverage
- economics
Part of The Internal World of Individual Choice