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Title
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The doctrine of λόγος defined schematically
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Description
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On the basis of the development of the doctrine of λόγος that we have outlined so far, we can define the problem schematically in order to gain an overview of the intrinsic context. Aristotle takes his starting point from the λόγος in general. The essence of the λόγος is σημαντικός, meaning. From here he proceeds to a specific λόγος, the λόγος ἀποφαντικός. As we have just heard, every propositional statement is either an ascribing or a denying. If we keep to the example of a true judgement, the blackboard is not red. κατάφασις and ἀπόφασις are the two forms of the λόγος ἀποφαντικός. Both forms have the inherent fundamental tendency to point out. Even in a negative statement I wish to say what the board is or is not. The two fundamental forms have the possibility of being true or being false. Being true or false, and thus the entire structure of the λόγος ἀποφαντικός, is grounded in σύνθεσις, which in itself is simultaneously διαίρεσις. The unity of this structure is the essence of νοῦς. We must keep this contextual order of founding in view in order to understand the next part of our interpretation, in the course of which we shall meet a new element that will enable us to unfurl the 'as'-structure as a whole.
We said by way of introduction that the 'as' is a relation. We have now seen, to begin with, that this relating is concerned with a σύνθεσις: it is a relating that takes together. Yet not only that. Rather this taking together is in itself a taking apart. We find not only this dual structure, however, but something else as well: Relating as an action, an activity, an occurrence, is one of νοήματα, a νοεῖν, an apprehending (νοῦς), an apprehending taking together and taking apart. This entails that whatever is taken apart is apprehended as such in its togetherness as such.
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Creator
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Heidegger, Martin
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Source
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The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics
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Bibliographic Citation
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Heidegger, Martin. 1995. The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics: World, Finitude, Solitude. Translated by William McNeill and Nicholas Walker. Indiana University Press. Pages 317-318.
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Heidegger, Martin. 1983. Die Grundbegriffe der Metaphysik. Welt–Endlichkeit–Einsamkeit. Vittorio Klostermann.
